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The emergence and maintenance of cooperation within sizable groups of unrelated humans offer
many challenges for our understanding. We propose that the humans’ capacity of communication,
such as how many and how far away the fellows one can build up mutual communication, may affect
the evolution of cooperation. We study this issue by means of the public goods game (PGG) with a
two-layered network of contacts. Players obtain payoffs from five-person public goods interactions
on a square lattice (the interaction layer). Also, they update strategies after communicating with
neighbours in learning layer, where two players build up mutual communication with a power law
probability depending on their spatial distance. Our simulation results indicate that the evolution
of cooperation is indeed sensitive to how players choose others to communicate with, including the
amount as well as the locations. The tendency of localised communication is proved to be a new
mechanism to promote cooperation.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 89.75.Hc, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
In behavioral sciences, evolutionary biology and more
recently in economics, understanding conditions for the
emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior
among unrelated and selfish individuals becomes a cen-
tral issue [1, 2]. In the investigation of this problem, the
most popular framework is game theory together with
its extensions involving evolutionary context [3, 4]. The
public goods game (PGG), which attracted much atten-
tion from economists, is a general paradigm to explain
cooperative behavior through group interactions [5]. The
PGG model is characterised by groups of cooperators do-
ing better than groups of defectors, but defectors always
outperforming the cooperators in their group. In typical
examples, the individual contributions are multiplied by
a factor r and then divided equally among all players.
With r smaller than the group size, this is an example
of a social dilemma: every individual player is better off
defecting than cooperating, no matter what the other
players do. Groups would therefore consist of defectors
only and forego the public good.
Considerable efforts have been concentrated on explo-
ration of the origin and persistence of cooperation. Dur-
ing the last decades, five rules, namely, kin selection [6],
direct reciprocity [7, 8], indirect reciprocity [9, 10], net-
work (or spatial) reciprocity [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16], and
group selection [17], have been found to benefit the evolu-
tion of cooperation in biological and ecological systems as
well as within human societies (for a review, see [18]). In
realistic systems, most interactions among elements are
spatially localised, which makes spatial or graph mod-
els more meaningful. Unlike the other four rules, spatial
games (i.e., network reciprocity) can lead to coopera-
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tive behavior in the absence of any strategic complex-
ity [11, 12, 13, 19]. In spatial evolutionary PGG, the co-
operators can survive by forming compact clusters, which
minimizes the exploitation by defectors [15]. Further-
more, Szabo´ and Hauert et al. have recently discussed
the effects of compulsory and voluntary interactions of
players in evolutionary PGG, with the structured pop-
ulations bound to regular lattices [15, 16, 20] as well as
with the well-mixed population [16, 21, 22, 23]. The fac-
tors such as the voluntary participation [20], and small
density of population [22], are found to be capable of
boosting cooperation. More recently, Huang et al. have
proposed an extended public goods interaction model to
study the evolution of cooperation in heterogeneous pop-
ulation, and proved that scale-free networks of contacts
can lead to more competitive cooperation [24].
In real world, people always wish to make decisions
based on a comprehensive knowledge of the pertinent
background, such as the historical performance of each
alternative choice [25], which they may obtain by learn-
ing from people they are regarding. However, the lim-
ited eyereach or capacity of humans actually exists and
induces the unperfect communication. One can merely
learn from a small set of people (corresponding to the
so-called “role models” in the context of cultural evolu-
tion [16, 26]). Furthermore, these role models rarely can
be extended over the whole population, but localised to
the learner’s “vicinity”, which abstractly implies the peo-
ple having similar characteristics as the learner (such as
religious background, age, education, lifestyle, or social
class) that in favour of building up mutual communica-
tion.
As a natural extension of those aforementioned factors,
an new intriguing task is to understand how the lim-
itation of communication capacity of people influences
the cooperative behavior in real world. In this letter,
we will study a spatially extended PGG on two-layered
graphs, where one layer especially depicts the communi-
2FIG. 1: The average lattice length of the shortcuts l in the
LN network with size N = L× L = 512, 1012, and 2012 (a).
And clustering coefficient E as a function of α for the LN with
q = 0, 0.5, 1, 2, and 5 (b). The plots are average values over
10 realizations of the LN network.
cation among players, with the aim to find out how the
evolution of cooperation depends on the players’ commu-
nications.
II. THE MODEL
In spatial game models, the players occupying the sites
of a graph can follow one of the two pure strategies, co-
operation (C) or defection (D). There are two types
of contacts among players in the evolutionary process:
players collect payoffs from their neighbours by playing
games with them [12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20], and then up-
date strategies by learning from neighbours. Thus, the
graph occupied by the players can be split into two lay-
ers, an interaction layer and a learning (communication)
layer [26, 27, 28]. The former one defines the interaction
neighbourhood (IN), i.e., who plays game with whom.
The latter one specifies learning neighbourhood (LN) for
evolutionary updating or, in other words, defines who-is-
the-role-model-of-whom.
In our model, the IN layer where players have public
goods interactions is a L×L square lattice with periodic
boundary conditions. The group size of the interaction
neighbours in the PGG therefore is NI = 5. The score
achieved in PGG interactions denotes the reproductive
success, i.e., the probability that other players will adopt
the player’s strategy. This score is assumed to be de-
termined merely by a single, typical PGG involving the
player and its four nearest interaction neighbours [15].
Thus the payoff of one player i is,
P (i) =
{
rnc
nc+nd
− 1 if s(i) = C,
rnc
nc+nd
if s(i) = D,
(1)
where nc, and nd (with nc + nd = NI = 5) denote, re-
spectively, the number of participants choosing C, and
D, and s(i) denotes the strategy of player i. The cooper-
ative investments are normalised to unity and r specifies
the multiplication factor on the public goods.
After each round of the game interactions, for the ref-
erence of the strategy update, each player communicates
with its role models (neighbours in the LN layer), inquir-
ing the individual information such as the payoff and the
strategy. The player’s capacity of communication can be
measured by how many and how far away the role models
it can selected. In order to regulate this capacity, we in-
troduce the LN layer as a variant of the two-dimensional
small-world network [29], in which connections to further
neighbours occur with a tunable power law probability.
This network is constructed by adding shortcuts among
the sites on a L×L square lattice. With periodic bound-
ary condition, the lattice distance between two sites (x, y)
and (x′, y′) can be written in a two-dimensional fashion
as
r(x,y),(x′,y′) = ∆x+∆y,
with
∆x = L/2− |(|x − x′| − L/2)|
∆y = L/2− |(|y − y′| − L/2)|.
This value is actually the length of the shortest path con-
necting these two sites through only lattice links. Each
site is additionally linked to q other sites [30] by shortcuts
(excluding its original nearest neighbours). Following the
idea of Kleinberg [29], those other sites are selected in a
biased manner: the probability that site j(xj , yj) is se-
lected to be linked to site i(xi, yi) by one shortcut de-
pends on the lattice distance between them in the fol-
lowing way,
P (r(xi,yi),(xj,yj)) =
1
A
r−α(xi,yi),(xj,yj), (2)
where α is a positive exponent and
A =
∑
(x′,y′) 6=(xi,yi),(xi±1,yi),(xi,yi±1)
r−α(x,y),(x′,y′), (3)
is a normalization factor. Obviously, the probability that
i and j are connected is
Pi↔j = 1− (1−
r−α(xi,yi),(xj,yj)
A
)2·q. (4)
For this network, when α = 0, it reduces to the small-
world model with random shortcuts [31]. As α increases,
one site’s shortcuts will be clustered in its vicinity and
two distant sites are less likely to be connected. Here, the
multiple or self-connected edges are not allowed. Such a
network has qN shortcuts and an average degree 〈k〉 ≈
4 + 2q. Figure 1 shows the average lattice length of the
shortcuts l, and the clustering coefficient E of this kind
graph. We clearly notice the increase of E with α by
reason of the clustered shortcuts.
In this paper, we just consider this kind network as the
LN of the game players where merely the information
flow takes place. In this LN network, the neighbours
linked by one edge act as the role model of each other
via mutual communication, and the degree of each site
corresponds to the amount of role models each player has.
For the sake of convenience, we call those role models
3FIG. 2: (a1), (a2), and (a3) show the stationary densities of cooperators ρc as a function of multiplication factor r for q = 0,
1, 2, and 5 denoted by different symbols. (b1), (b2), and (b3) plot the corresponding phase diagrams. The two bold solid lines
shows the average rc (lower) and rd (upper). The straight dot line in the middle is r = 5.0. The three dash lines from bottom
to top present the contours ρc = 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75, respectively. The red dash-dot lines in (b1) and (b2) show the cross points
of those ρc curves of q 6= 0 with the curves of q = 0. (c1), (c2), and (c3) show the strategy update rate R in the dynamical
equilibrium state as a function of ρc. The results are averaged over 10 realizations of the N = 51
2 systems with α = 0 (left), 2
(middle), and 5 (right).
introduced by shortcuts the additional role models
(shortly ARMs). Thus, each player has 2q ARMs on
average. Also, the biased effect of nonzero α, giving rise
to the clustering of shortcuts, can be understood as the
“localization” of players’ communication.
Following previous studies [15, 19], the evolution of the
present system is governed by random sequential strategy
adoptions, that is, the randomly chosen player i adopts
one of its (randomly chosen) role model j’s strategy with
a probability depending on the payoff difference
W [s(j)→ s(i)] =
1
1 + exp{[P (i)− P (j) + τ ]/κ}
, (5)
where τ > 0 denotes the cost of strategy change, and
κ characterises the noise introduced to permit irrational
choices. For κ = 0 the neighbouring strategy s(j) is
adopted deterministically provided the payoff difference
exceeds the cost of strategy change, i.e., P (j)−P (i) > τ .
For κ > 0, strategies performing worse are also adopted
with a certain probability, e.g., due to imperfect informa-
tion. It is proved that the dynamics remains unaffected
qualitatively when changing κ, and τ within realistic lim-
its. Following the previous work [15], we simply fix the
value of κ and τ to be 0.1, and concentrate on the general
dynamical properties affected by the structure of LN.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
We study above model by Monte-Carlo (MC) simu-
lations started from a random initial distribution of C
and D strategies. After appropriate relaxation times, the
system can converge to a dynamical equilibrium state.
We characterise this state by the stationary density of
cooperators ρc averaged over the last 5000 MC steps of
the 25000 total sampling steps. Figures 2 (a1), (a2), and
(a3) show the dependence of stationary density of coop-
erators ρc on the multiplication factor r for the systems
with α = 0, 2, and 5, respectively. The simulation data
result from an average over either ten realizations of inde-
pendent initial strategy distributions or ten realizations
of the LN networks. For q = 0, i.e., when the IN and
LN are identical, we recover the results of ref. [15]: be-
low the threshold value r < rc = 4.526(1) cooperators
quickly vanish (the absorbing homogenous state with all
defectors), whereas for high r > rd defectors go extinct
(the absorbing homogenous state with all cooperators);
for intermediate r, strategies C and D coexist in dynami-
cal equilibrium. The rc (rd) indicates the value of r where
cooperators (defectors) vanish. In the case that q 6= 0,
i.e., when each player can communicate with more ARMs
via shortcuts, the quantitative properties of the station-
ary density ρc are different [see the curves with different
q in figs. 2 (a1), (a2) and (a3)].
4One can find from figs. 2 (a1), and (a2) that, each of the
ρc curve with q 6= 0 has a cross point (denoted by rcross)
with the curve of q = 0. The density of cooperators ρc
for the system with larger q is comparatively smaller at
r < rcross region, but larger ρc at r > rcross region. That
is to say, for the systems with α = 0 and 2, the more
available role models will favour cooperators when r is
large, and favour defectors in contrast when r is small.
However, the system with α = 5 [figs. 2 (a3)] is obviously
different from that of α = 0 and 2, that is, the ARMs can
favour cooperators in the whole range of r with respect
to the q = 0 system, moreover, defectors vanish at much
lower r.
We plot the phase diagrams of the corresponding sys-
tems in figs. 2 (b1), (b2), and (b3), respectively. The
two bold solid curves respectively show the rc and rd av-
eraged over 10 realizations, which divide the region into
absorbing homogenous states of C (upper) and D (lower),
as well as the coexistence regime of the two strategies (in-
termediate). That is, for fixed number of ARMs, when
varying the factor r, two phase transitions occur between
the coexistence region and homogeneous states of C or
D. In the coexistence regime, the three dash lines present
the contours ρc = 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75, respectively. The
straight dot line in the middle corresponds to r = 5.0,
larger than which the social dilemma raised by the PGG
with NI = 5 is relaxed in the sense that each unity in-
vestment has a positive net return. As q = 0 defectors
may exist in the system and exploit cooperators until r
is very larger. However, from the rapid decline of rd with
increasing q we know that, with the aid of the ARMs,
defectors vanish at much smaller r. More, interestingly,
even if r < 5.0, defectors can be eliminated as long as
q > 3.49 for α = 0, q > 2.42 for α = 2, or q > 1.41 for
α = 5. Also, the region of homogenous C becomes wider
as the value of α increases.
The cross points rcross of those ρc curves of q 6= 0 with
the curve of q = 0 in fig. 2 (a1) [and (a2)] are marked
by the (red) dash-dot line in the phase diagram. The
coexistence regime of C and D thus is separated into two
regions by this line, with ARMs favouring cooperation
in the upper region, but favouring defection in the lower
region. It can be seen that, the cross points rcross is not
sensitive to the parameter q. For the system with α = 2
the upper region favouring cooperation is comparatively
wider than that with α = 0. Moreover, for the system
with α = 5 [see figs. 2 (a3) and (b3)], those ρc curves are
not intersectant, and the ARMs favour cooperators in the
whole range of r. The curves of rc, rd, and other contours
of ρc for various α systems are proved to asymptotically
approach r = 5.0 with increasing q, and finally collapse
into one there (r = 5.0) for q → ∞, which implies that
each player can learn from the whole population. That
is to say, as a result of the dynamical process the system
with q →∞ will end up in the absorbing D state for any
r smaller than 5.0, where the first-order phase transition
from D to C takes place.
We also notice that the ARMs may affect the severity
FIG. 3: Snapshots of typical distributions of cooperators
(black) and defectors (white) on square lattice of N = 2012 for
multiplication factor r = 4.9 (upper) and 4.6 (lower). (a) and
(c) correspond to the case with identical IN and LN, while (b)
and (d) correspond to the case of LN with α = 2 and q = 2.
of the competition between C and D, which is charac-
terised by the rate of the effective strategy update R
(the fraction of players who adopt the opposite strategy
in each generation averaged over 1000 MC steps). For
the sake of comparison, the rate R are plotted as a func-
tion of ρc in figs. 2 (c1), (c2), and (c3) for the systems
with α = 0, 2, and 5, respectively. For a given station-
ary density ρc, the system with larger q results in larger
rate R, which implies that more ARMs induce more in-
tense competition. This is due to the additional mutual
contacts between C and D, or, in other words the larger
surface between C and D in the LN network, induced
by the additional shortcuts. Also, R exhibits a bell-like
form, because the surface between C and D will shrink
with the density difference of the two strategies. Addi-
tionally, for a given value of q, the system with larger α
are found to result in smaller rate R.
Figure 3 shows the snapshots of the system with iden-
tical IN and LN (left hand), as well as the system with
q = 2 and α = 2 LN (right hand), respectively. For the
case of identical IN and LN [fig. 3(a)(c)], it is known from
PGG and other cooperation games that, cooperators per-
sist through forming compact C clusters and thereby re-
ducing exploitation by defectors [12, 15, 19, 24? ]. How-
ever, for the availability of ARMs [fig. 3(b)(d)], the C
clusters break into smaller pieces. Furthermore, one in-
teresting phenomenon distinctly exhibited in fig. 3 (d)
is, some rare cooperators may take place at the sites
totally surrounded by defectors, where it is extremely
difficult for C to survive because of the very low pay-
offs. These sites are found to be connected by shortcuts
to the well-paid C role models who are located in the
C clusters. Therefore, we can say that, the C strategy
is adopted there when players blindly imitate the suc-
cessful role models without regard to their own actual
5FIG. 4: Stationary densities of cooperators ρc as a function
of α with r ranges from 4.5 to 5.05. The results are averaged
over 10 realizations of the system with N = 2012 and q = 2.
‘habitats’. This may correspond to the phenomenon in
society that, some people follow like sheep to the manner
of others ignoring the question whether it fits into their
own social surrounding. Interestingly, this unreasonable
behavior simply introduces mutations to the population
of D. We therefore suggest that, it may provide one mech-
anism to favour cooperation, for the invasions of C may
form mutual protection and thus survive in the popula-
tion of D, although the rare C therein are unstable and
hard to propagate by themselves. In addition, these sites
exhibit one path to put up the fluctuating individuals [?
], who alternatively spend some time as cooperators and
some time as defectors.
Finally, we focus our attention on how the localised
communication affects the evolution of cooperation. The
stationary density of cooperators ρc at different values
of r are plotted as a function of α in fig. 4. We can
see that the values of ρc keep almost invariable in the
region 0 ≤ α < 1. This can be naturally understood
from the results in fig. 1, as well as the analysis in the
ref. [32, 33, 34] that, in this region the LN network be-
haves as a small world with the topological properties
changing slowly with α. However, in the large α region,
which implies that the LN is distinctly localised, cooper-
ation is favoured more compared to the case with α = 0.
We have known that, the cooperators protect each other
and survive by forming clusters. Thus, when the short-
cuts are clustered by larger α, one cooperator is more
likely to select role models within its own C cluster via
shortcuts. That is to say, the mutual protection among
cooperators is enhanced by large α, and thereby cooper-
ation is favoured. This mechanism is obviously reflected
by the monotonic increase of ρc with α at large α re-
gion. Furthermore, the best communication strategy for
players to promote cooperation is α → ∞, which corre-
sponds to the extremely localised selection of ARMs, i.e.,
the LN network with the shortcuts merely connects the
next-nearest neighbours through lattice links.
It is also notable in fig. 4 that, the ρc monotonically
increases with α when r is comparatively large (about
r > 4.6), however, the nonmonotonic behaviors of ρc
occur for the cases of smaller r. This result is proved
to remain unaffected qualitatively for different vales of q
within realistic limits. As it is well known, the cooper-
ators located along the boundary of the C clusters (the
so-called boundary C in the following text) outweigh
the losses against defectors by gains from interactions
within the C cluster [14, 19]. These boundary C gain
low payoffs and thus would be sensitive to the introduc-
tion of the ARMs, i.e., what kind of role models they
meet with via shortcuts really matters. The system at
the coexistence state is composed of cooperators as well
as two kinds of defectors, the defector located right at the
boundary of C cluster which we named D1, and the defec-
tor surrounded by the same-strategy interaction neigh-
bours which we named D2. One D1 would accumulate
comparatively higher payoff by exploiting the boundary
C, and then act as an attractive role model of its learning
neighbours. However, one D2 gains zero payoff, and thus
will not affect the stability of others’ strategy. They put
up fluctuating individuals if they are linked to well-paid
C by shortcuts, as that discussed above. In our model,
the players will choose ARMs nearer and nearer to its
vicinity as α increases from 0. When α is around 2.5,
the lattice lengths of these shortcuts (see fig. 1) approx-
imately reach the general size of the C clusters, then the
probability for the boundary C to meet with the well-paid
D1 players becomes larger, which would pose a high risk
to the stability of the boundary C. The C cluster becomes
constricted and thus cooperation is depressed when the
boundary C imitates D1. This effect can be clearly ob-
served from the comparatively smaller ρc around α = 2.5
at small r (see fig. 4). However, when the value of r
is large, this effect is weakened by the C clusters highly
crowded [see fig. 3(b)].
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have shown how the communication
among players may affect the evolution of cooperation
by means of a two-layered PGG model. The learning
layer is constructed as a Kleinberg small-world network,
where two players can communicate with probability de-
pending on their spatial Euclidean lattice distance in the
power-law form controlled by an exponent α. The play-
ers’ capacity of communication is characterised by the
number and the distance of the role models from whom
they can learn the individual information. The biased
effect of nonzero α, which gives rise to the preferential
selection of role models near the vicinity, corresponds
to the localization of players’ communication induced by
limited capacity. Our simulation results indicate that,
the communication among players plays a highly impor-
tant role in the evolution of cooperation: the density of
C is crucially influenced by the number (q) and the loca-
tion of the ARMs; the coexistence region of C and D is
reduced and rc (rd) is expected to tend to 5 (the group
6size NI) if q increases; in addition, for certain density of
C, more available ARMs result in more intense competi-
tion between C and D. Moreover, the communication via
shortcuts (i.e. the ARMs) are found to introduce muta-
tion to the population of D, which might be helpful to
the emergence of C. It is also notable that, the localised
communication with large α can favour cooperators.
Our model gives a crude simulation of real social be-
havior. However, it does catch a few features of poten-
tial interest. The most interesting feature is the localised
communication favouring cooperation. We suggest that,
the limitation of humans’ capacity to build up commu-
nication system, which results in the localised selection
of role models, would be a new mechanism supporting
the emergence and persistence of cooperation in society.
The other feature is that a population of cheaters would
be invaded by cooperators by the presence of long-range
social connections.
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